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REGULATION FOR CONSERVATIVES: 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE CASE FOR 
"ASYMMETRIC PATERNALISM" 
COLIN CAMERER, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, 
TED O'DONOGHUE, AND MATTHEW RABINt 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulation by the state can take a variety of forms. Some regula- 
tions are aimed entirely at redistribution, such as when we tax the rich 
and give to the poor. Other regulations seek to counteract external- 
ities by restricting behavior in a way that imposes harm on an individ- 
ual basis but yields net societal benefits. A good example is taxation to 
fund public goods such as roads. In such situations, an individual 
would be better off if she alone were exempt from the tax; she benefits 
when everyone (including herself) must pay the tax. 
In this paper, we are concerned with a third form of regulation: 
paternalistic regulations that are designed to help on an individual ba- 
sis. Paternalism treads on consumer sovereignty by forcing, or pre- 
venting, choices for the individual's own good, much as when parents 
limit their child's freedom to skip school or eat candy for dinner. Re- 
cent research in behavioral economics has identified a variety of deci- 
sion-making errors that may expand the scope of paternalistic regula- 
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tion.1 To the extent that the errors identified by behavioral research 
lead people not to behave in their own best interests, paternalism may 
prove useful. But, to the extent that paternalism prevents people 
from behaving in their own best interests, paternalism may prove 
costly.2 
Our purpose in this Article is to argue that in many cases it is pos- 
sible to have one's cake and eat it too. We propose an approach to 
evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines that we call "asym- 
metric paternalism." A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it 
creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little 
or no harm on those who are fully rational.3 Such regulations are 
relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best 
interest, while at the same time advantageous to those making subop- 
timal choices. 
We then document existing and potential regulatory responses to 
decision-making errors that satisfy this criterion. Our paper seeks to 
engage two different audiences with two different sets of concerns: 
For those (particularly economists) prone to rigid antipaternalism, the 
paper describes a possibly attractive rationale for paternalism as well as 
a careful, cautious, and disciplined approach. For those prone to give 
See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998) (concluding that individuals realistically display only 
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest; and calling for a 
more complex, and accurate, economic analysis of law); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (2000) (finding that individuals frequently "fail 
to maximize their expected utility," and identifying behavioral factors that may compli- 
cate the cost-benefit analysis by individuals on which much of rational choice theory 
depends). 
Many regulations are ambiguous in terms of whether they are better classified as 
paternalistic or aimed at counteracting externalities. "Helmet laws" for motorcyclists, 
for example, probably reflect a mixture of paternalistic motivations-concerns that 
motorcyclists who don't wear helmets fail to truly appreciate the risks they are taking- 
and externality motivations-chiefly, that society will have to pick up the tab for medi- 
cal expenses created by accidents involving motorcyclists who don't wear helmets. 
This idea has been presented under the rubric of "cautious paternalism." See 
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in 
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 150 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 
1999) (describing how policies based on "cautious paternalism" can be "valuable if 
people are making errors, but... have relatively small costs if people are fully ra- 
tional") [hereinafter O'Donoghue & Rabin, Procrastination]; cf Ted O'Donoghue & 
Matthew Rabin, Risky Behavior Among Youths: Some Issues from Behavioral Economics, in 
RISKY BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTHS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29, 31 (Jonathan Gruber 
ed., 2001) (advocating a principled method to study when and how youths make er- 
rors, which interventions mitigate errors, and when interventions help more than they 
harm). 
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unabashed support for paternalistic policies based on behavioral eco- 
nomics, this paper argues that more discipline is needed and proposes 
a possible criterion. 
Historically, the core justification for paternalism arose from skep- 
ticism about the ability of certain categories of people to make deci- 
sions in their best interest.4 Beginning in the nineteenth century, this 
category was comprised of those deemed incapable of contracting for 
themselves, including, in the words of one leading case, "idiots, mi- 
nors or married women."" Paternalism was the appropriate social re- 
sponse for those who were to be treated ultimately as wards of the 
state.6 While our conception of the competence of women has 
changed markedly, and the "idiot" designation arouses discomfort, 
this general rationale for paternalism persists. 
Our approach accords even better with a second justification for 
paternalism which focuses on situations rather than persons. A num- 
ber of regulations reflect the fear that even people of sound mind 
might not act in their long-term self-interest in certain predictable 
situations. For example, usury laws and laws against selling oneself 
into indefinite servitude protect those in desperate economic straits 
from accepting contracts with potentially devastating long-term con- 
sequences.7 Health and safety regulation of dangerous occupations 
was based on fears that pressure to provide for one's family might lead 
people to incur risks deemed unacceptable to the larger society.8 
Regulation of narcotics may stem from concerns that narcotics have 
the capacity to turn ordinarily functioning people into the equivalent 
of "minors" or "idiots."9 
Cf infra Part III.B (considering proposals embodying varying degrees of asym- 
metric paternalism that will assist irrational individuals to make better decisions). 
5Rogers v. Higgins, 48 111. 211, 217 (1868), available at 1868 WL 5084, at *4. 
6 See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998) (pro- 
viding examples of paternalistic regulations focusing on those considered to be of lim- 
ited capacity). 
See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763, 
778-84 (1983) (arguing that the possibilities of regret and disappointment justify laws 
against "self-enslavement"); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of 
the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 
24J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 312-14 (1995) (detailing historical justifications for usury laws). 
See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 393-98 (1898) (upholding maximum 
hours legislation regulating the underground mining industry). 
Cf, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ? 1503(a) (1996) (prohibiting the issuance of drivers 
licenses to categories of individuals who are "user[s] of alcohol or any controlled sub- 
stance" and persons who have been adjudged "to be afflicted with or suffer[] from any 
mental disability or disease"). 
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Recent developments in the social sciences have provided new 
foundations for paternalism. The latest entrant into the paternalism 
debate comes from the introduction into legal analysis of develop- 
ments in behavioral economics. By cataloging a list of common deci- 
sion-making errors that even highly competent, well-functioning peo- 
ple make in predictable situations, this research potentially broadens 
the scope of situations in which paternalistic policies could usefully be 
developed. 
This Article, and our pursuit of an approach we term "asymmetric 
paternalism," reflect trepidations shared among all of the authors 
about the use of behavioral research to justify paternalistic policies. 
We have two major concerns. First, while research in behavioral eco- 
nomics documents common mistakes, those mistakes are typically far 
from universal,'0 and we worry that paternalistic policies may impose 
undue burdens on those people who are behaving rationally in a par- 
ticular situation. Second, behavioral economics is in an early stage of 
development, and therefore its findings should elicit more caution 
than those from more "mature" fields (which are by no means them- 
selves invulnerable to revision). These and related concerns suggest 
caution in promoting paternalistic policies at this stage and lead to 
our more conservative notion of asymmetric paternalism.1 
I. BOUNDS ON RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
The standard approach in economics assumes "full rationality." 
While disagreement exists as to what exactly full rationality encom- 
passes, most economists would agree on the following basic compo- 
nents:12 First, people have well-defined preferences (or goals) and 
1See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1734-41 (1998) (noting that substantive deviations from the ra- 
tional choice model found in the endowment effect, hindsight bias, and self-serving 
biases require more research before they can be incorporated into an accurate behav- 
ioral model). 
We also echo the common intuition that people may have an intrinsic taste for 
free choice, and many of the policies we discuss may be worse than described if people 
believe that they encroach on their freedom. Yet not all of what we propose actually 
leads to less choice. We feel that how people perceive limits on their free choice 
should itself be subject to behavioral research, rather than be treated as an axiom of 
resistance in the exploration of paternalism. 
Compare Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998) (emphasizing the prevalence of "rational" thought in 
rational choice, as opposed to behavioral, economics), withJolls et al., supra note 1, at 
1476-81 (emphasizing the notion that "actual" individuals display "bounded rational- 
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make decisions to maximize those preferences. Second, those prefer- 
ences accurately reflect (to the best of the person's knowledge) the 
true costs and benefits of the available options. Third, in situations 
that involve uncertainty, people have well-formed beliefs about how 
uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information becomes 
available, they update their beliefs using Bayes's law-the presumed 
ability to update probabilistic assessments in light of new informa- 
tion.3 
Behavioral economics challenges all of these assumptions and at- 
tempts to replace them with more realistic approaches based on scien- 
tific findings from other social sciences.4 Its development in the past 
two decades can be traced to two parallel, complementary intellectual 
lines of research. One line of research consisted of experimental work 
by cognitive psychologists who began to identify a wide range of deci- 
sion-making "anomalies"-patterns of judgment and choice that were 
inconsistent with utility maximization and/or Bayesian updating-and 
to identify cognitive shortcuts or "heuristics" that could potentially ac- 
count for the anomalies.' The second, parallel effort was conducted 
by economists who felt the rational choice paradigm should be ex- 
tended to account for normal bounds on rationality, while maintain- 
ing the emphasis on formal rigor and field applications that sets eco- 
nomics apart from some other social sciences.'6 Cognitive psychology 
provided ideal raw material that could be used to inform new theories 
of economic choice. 
One can distinguish two phases, or "waves," in the modern (post- 
1980) history of behavioral economics. The first wave identified a va- 
ity," rather than the universal rationality envisioned by rational choice economics). 
For a general discussion of applications of Bayes's law, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET 
AL., GAME THEORYAND THE LAW 79-121 (1994). 
14 See, e.g., CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, at x-xvii (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000) (explaining the editors' desire to compile literature that would ex- 
pand and "get right" the prospect theory of decision making); Colin Camerer & 
George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present and Future, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin Camerer et al. eds., forthcoming 2003). 
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris- 
tics and Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 4 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (arguing that "representativeness heuristic[s], in which 
probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is representative of B," lead to "se- 
rious errors, because similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several fac- 
tors that should affectjudgments of probability"). 
1See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 QJ. ECON. 
99, 103-10 (1955) (using traditional economic analysis to develop "approximate" defi- 
nitions of rationality that more closely reflect human behavior). 
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riety of disparate phenomena that were all anomalous compared to 
rational choice predictions, but which otherwise had little in com- 
mon. As a result, early critics of behavioral economics often com- 
plained that it was just a laundry list of departures from rational 
choice. The second wave is now gathering force and it represents a 
scientific consolidation that addresses this critique.18 Precise functions 
that add one or two free parameters to standard rational theories are 
being applied to explain important anomalies and make fresh predic- 
tions. 
Some research in behavioral economics has focused on how peo- 
ple's preferences are not what economists had supposed. For in- 
stance, in evaluating risky gambles over uncertain outcomes, people 
seem disproportionately averse to losses, and also dislike choosing in 
the face of "ambiguity" (knowing that they are missing information 
that would, if available, affect their decision).'9 As another example, 
people seem to have social preferences that cause them to care about 
more than merely maximizing their own material payoffs.20 These de- 
7 See, e.g., Daniel McFadden, Rationality for Economists?, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
73, 73 (1999) (examining anomalies of behavior from the standard economic model of 
perception, preference, and process rationality, and arguing that studies of how per- 
ceptions are formed and how they influence decision making, may help build a new 
economic analysis). 
See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 14 (surveying and providing examples of 
recent developments in behavioral economics). 
See Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 14, at 289 tbl.16.1 (giving ten examples of 
patterns-in consumer choice, financial and housing markets, betting, insurance, and 
labor supply-which are parsimoniously explained by elements of prospect theory and 
isolation of a single choice or moment from other decisions); Colin Camerer & Martin 
Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 325, 360 (reviewing experimental evidence, theories, and applications of 
research on the aversion to ambiguity in decision making); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 
(1979) (showing that disproportionate aversion to losses and over- and under-weighing 
of probabilities influence choices of risky outcomes); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne- 
man, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 QJ. ECON. 1039, 
1054-58 (1991) (exploring the theory that losses have greater impact on preferences 
than gains, and that this may help explain such phenomena as brand loyalty and nego- 
tiating strategies). 
2See, e.g., Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and 
Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166, 166 (2000) (demonstrating a simple economic 
model that generates consistent results premised on the fact that the relative payoff- 
how a person's payoff compares to others'-motivates people); Gary Charness & Mat- 
thew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 QJ. ECON. 817, 849-51 
(2002) (finding that individuals are more concerned with increasing social welfare 
than with reducing differences in payoffs and that individuals are motivated by reci- 
procity); Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Coopera- 
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velopments challenge the descriptive validity of standard economic 
models, but they do not raise questions about the rationality of eco- 
nomic behavior. To the extent that such tendencies accurately reflect 
true preferences, they do not create a need for paternalism.21 
But a large part of behavioral economics describes ways people 
sometimes fail to behave in their own best interests. For instance, a 
substantial body of literature examines how people with self-control 
problems may fail to carry out their desired course of action.2 An- 
other has documented the ways in which people fail to process infor- 
mation as Bayes's rule would require.23 And a variety of researchers 
tion, 114 QJ. ECON. 817, 855-56 (1999) (exploring economic models of self-centered 
inequity aversion-when people are willing to give up material payoff for an equitable 
outcome-and gaining insight into how an economic environment determines 
whether fair types or selfish types dominate); George F. Loewenstein et al., Social Utility 
and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426, 
438-39 (1989) (studying social utility in a dispute context in order to estimate social 
utility functions that could be used to predict individual behavior in situations where 
decisions had consequences not only for the self but also for another party); Matthew 
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 
1281-82 (1993) (developing a game-theoretic solution concept of "fairness equilib- 
rium," in which people like to help those helping them and hurt those who are hurting 
them). 
Such tendencies do, of course, have policy implications-for example, a better 
understanding of risk preferences could help us design more efficient insurance poli- 
cies. And as discussed below, infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, there is signifi- 
cant evidence that not all "risk preferences" that manifest themselves in choice behav- 
ior seem to be fully rational in the sense of maximizing experienced welfare. As such, 
there may be room for paternalism even in this domain. 
See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 
444-45 (1997) (claiming that consumers invest in illiquid assets, which promise to gen- 
erate substantial future benefits as a commitment device to augment personal self- 
control in the face of inconsistent preferences); George Loewenstein, Out of Control: 
Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG'L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272- 
73 (1996) (arguing that the disjunction between behavior and perceived self-interest 
results from visceral factors which, at high levels of intensity, can become "so powerful 
as to virtually preclude decisionmaking"); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It 
Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 118-20 (1999) (analyzing the circumstances in 
which self-control problems lead people not to carry out their desired course of ac- 
tion). 
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 5 (attributing the violation to Bayes's 
rule by evaluating probabilities based on stereotypes and not prior probabilities). A 
number of sources have laid out formal models of biases in judgment that reflect dis- 
tinctions from Bayesian reasoning. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Inference by Believers in the 
Law of Small Numbers, 117 QJ. ECON. 775, 776, 785-87 (2002) (identifying systematic 
departure from Bayesian reasoning because of biases "such as belief in law of small 
numbers, the gambler's fallacy and overinference"); Matthew Rabin &Joel Schrag, First 
Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 QJ. ECON. 37, 38-39 (1999) (defin- 
ing confirmatory bias as when an actor interprets ambiguous evidence to confirm her 
current hypothesis about the world while a proper Bayesian observer would favor a dif- 
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have shown that people exhibit systematic mispredictions about the 
costs and benefits of choices-for example, the degree of loss aversion 
exhibited in people's choices seems inconsistent with their actual ex- 
periences of gains and losses.24 It is such errors-apparent violations 
of rationality-that can justify the need for paternalistic policies to 
help people make better decisions and come closer to behaving in 
their own best interest. 
Behavioral economics extends economic theory in a manner simi- 
lar to other successful extensions. The simplest models in economics 
assume perfect competition, perfect information, and perfect rational- 
ity. These boundary cases are obviously unrealistic much of the time, 
but can yield plain insight and useful approximations. Furthermore, 
gradually relaxing each of these strict assumptions has proved produc- 
tive. Starting in the 1930s, economists began to relax the assumption 
of perfect competition by firms and agents, which helped to spawn a 
wave of innovative research in industrial organization.25 Beginning in 
the 1970s, the assumption of perfect information was relaxed (in mod- 
els of costly search, screening, signaling, and so forth) with enormous 
success.26 Relaxing the assumptions of perfect rationality represents a 
logical next step in this productive progression. 
The scientific consolidation of psychological findings into a new 
brand of behavioral economic theory breathes new life into the ra- 
tionales for paternalistic regulation discussed above. In a sense, behav- 
ioral economics extends the paternalistically protected category of 
"idiots" to include most people, at predictable times. The challenge is 
figuring out what sorts of "idiotic" behaviors are likely to arise rou- 
tinely and how to prevent them, while imposing minimal restrictions 
on those who behave rationally. 
ferent hypothesis). 
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 19, at 1047-48 (finding that the introduc- 
tion of a disadvantage tends to decrease the valuation a person places on something 
more than the introduction of an advantage tends to increase its value); see also Mi- 
chael Strahilevitz & George Loewenstein, The Effect of Ownership History on the Valuation 
of Objects, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 276, 285 (1998) (finding a duration-of-current- 
ownership effect, "according to which selling prices increase as a function of how long 
an object has been owned"). 
See generally George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in 
the Economics of Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME 3 (George Loewenstein & Jon 
Falster eds., 1992) (chronicling the evolution of economic thought). 
2See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 195-242 (1984) 
(applying strategic analysis and game theory to interactive problems in situations of 
incomplete information). 
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II. ASYMMETRIC PATERNALISM 
To understand asymmetric paternalism, consider first how one 
might evaluate paternalistic policies more generally. To fix ideas, 
suppose (1) we can divide consumers into two types: those who are 
boundedly rational (in the sense described above) and those who are 
fully rational; and that (2) a fraction, p, of consumers fall into the 
boundedly rational category. Suppose further that a proposed pater- 
nalistic policy is designed to counteract mistakes made by boundedly 
rational consumers but, by restricting behavior, might impose costs on 
fully rational consumers. Let B denote the net benefits to boundedly 
rational agents, and let C denote the net costs to rational agents. The 
policy might also involve implementation costs, which we denote by 
I.27 Finally, the policy might alter firms' profits, which we denote by 
A41. The proposed policy is, on net, beneficial if: 
(p * B) - [(1 -p) * C] - I + Al > 0 (1) 
Our focus is not on paternalistic policies generally but rather on a 
specific type of paternalistic policy: a policy is asymmetrically paternalis- 
tic if it creates large benefits for those people who are boundedly ra- 
tional (B is large) while imposing little or no harm on those who are 
fully rational (C is small). Such policies are appealing because, even 
possessing little information about the frequency of consumer errors, 
as long as we think p is positive-as long as we can get even the truest 
believer in consumer rationality to concede that some agents, some of 
the time, exhibit bounded rationality-we can conclude with some 
confidence that the policy is on net beneficial. Taken to its extreme, 
pure asymmetric paternalism-situations in which B > 0 and C = 0- 
can only help consumers. 
Of course, two caveats are in order, reflecting the third and fourth 
terms in equation (1). First, we certainly need to be wary of imple- 
mentation costs. Indeed, an integral part of asymmetric paternalism is 
not only that policies impose small costs on fully rational consumers, 
but also that they involve low implementation costs. As in all policy- 
making, judgment and consensus will be required, but we suspect that 
it will often be possible to find examples in which the benefits are suf- 
ficiently large relative to both the costs imposed on fully rational types 
27 If bureaucrats design or implement the policy badly, due to their own rationality 
bounds or regulatory capture, then Iwill be large. 
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and the implementation costs so that most people can agree that the 
policy is worthwhile.28 
Second, we acknowledge that, to the extent that we are correct 
about consumers making errors, firms may benefit from exploiting 
these errors (either intentionally or unintentionally), and hence may 
suffer under asymmetrically paternalistic policies. However, we claim 
that any asymmetrically paternalistic policy that helps boundedly ra- 
tional consumers make better choices must, on net, increase eco- 
nomic efficiency as measured by the sum of consumer and producer 
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Figure 1 depicts the classic case of a negative consumption external- 
ity-as when one's consumption of loud music creates disutility for 
2 And occasionally, paternalistic policies could have "negative implementation 
costs." For example, a policy might advocate that courts refuse to help enforce or en- 
tertain law suits regarding contracts that are deemed unwise; or a policy that provides 
for laws against hasty marriages could diminish the number of full-fledged divorce and 
child custody legal cases the states will eventually face. 
2Of course, asymmetrically paternalistic policies are not likely to yield Pareto im- 
provements, wherein everyone benefits. In particular, to the extent that the owners of 
firms are not a random sample of consumers, asymmetrically paternalistic policies will 
tend to transfer surplus from the owners of firms to consumers. 
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one's neighbors. In this situation, the supply curve reflects the private 
and social costs of production (which coincide). But where the de- 
mand curve reflects the private benefits of consumption, negative con- 
sumption externalities imply that the social benefits of consumption 
are smaller than the private benefits. As a result, the market produces 
a larger quantity than is socially desirable and, while reducing produc- 
tion might hurt firms, it increases social surplus. 
When consumers make errors, it is as if they are imposing exter- 
nalities on themselves because the decisions they make (as reflected by 
their demand) do not accurately reflect the benefits they derive.30 
The goal of asymmetric paternalism is to help boundedly rational con- 
sumers make better decisions and align their demand more closely 
with the true benefits they derive from consumption. To the extent 
that such policies succeed, they will result in superior social outcomes 
even if individual firms are hurt. However, it is not necessarily the 
case that firms will be hurt; if consumer errors are in the direction of 
buying too little, asymmetric paternalism may have the beneficial side 
effect of increasing firms' profits. 
A. The Goal of Asymmetric Paternalism 
The concept of asymmetric paternalism is useful for three differ- 
ent purposes. The first is to clarify the terms of an emerging debate 
among legal scholars. On one side are conservative scholars, such as 
Richard Posner, who assume that individuals are generally rational31- 
and hence need not, and should not, be regulated-and that even 
well-meant regulations might backfire because of both regulatory cap- 
ture and the bounded rationality of bureaucrats.32 On the other side 
are scholars influenced by behavioral economics, such as Jolls, Sun- 
stein, and Thaler, whose recent article advocates an approach dubbed 
30 
Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, and Vaughan refer to externalities imposed on 
the self as "internalities." R. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: In- 
ternalitites in Individual Choice, 6J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining 
an "internality" as a within-person externality, "which occurs when a person under- 
weighs or ignores a consequence of his or her own behavior for him or herself'). 
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-17 (3d ed. 1986) (de- 
fending the assumption of rationality in economic models of law). 
See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ- 
ence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371, 372 (1983) (setting out the role of capture in directing public 
policy by analyzing how competition among pressure groups seeking political influ- 
ence affects taxes, subsidies, and other political favors and reduces aggregate effi- 
ciency). 
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"anti-antipaternalism-a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an 
affirmative defense of paternalism."33 Asymmetric paternalism goes a 
step further by providing an affirmative defense of paternalistic poli- 
cies, albeit only those that are asymmetrically paternalistic.34 These 
policies impose minimal costs if the conservatives are right, and 
maximal benefits if rationality and will-power are as bounded as many 
behavioral economists believe. Asymmetric paternalism might equally 
well be designated by the term we use in our title: "paternalism for 
conservatives." 
A crucial assumption in our approach is that the bounds on ra- 
tionality-their range and implications, as well as which policies 
help-are empirical questions subject to systematic analysis, and thus 
cost-benefit judgments can be made. As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 
wrote, "[n]o axiom demonstrates that people make choices that serve 
their best interests; this is a question to be answered based on evi- 
dence."35 Of course, to the extent that faith-based antipaternalism 
practiced by some legal scholars rests on such an axiom, scientific de- 
bate will be unproductive. But we are optimistic that a common em- 
pirical ground could emerge. The ambitious analogy we have in mind 
is the influence of medicine and nutrition on policy. Health and food 
regulations are heavily informed by scientific understanding (albeit an 
understanding sometimes captured by special interests) and by a wide- 
spread belief among professionals that average folks require informa- 
tion, prodding, and often regulation to improve their health and 
diet.36 Thus are born paternalistic policies such as food content labels, 
warnings on cigarette packs, active anti-tobacco advertising, and FDA 
grading. We envision a vaguely similar system in which substituting 
33 
Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1541. 
Thus we mildly part company with Professor Zamir, who looks to behavioral in- 
sights in part to determine when paternalistic rules are efficient. Cf Zamir, supra note 
6, at 267-71 (presenting a model in which "cognitive illusions" affect the efficiency of 
individual responses to paternalistic policies). We agree with Professor Zamir that 
bounded rationality implicates paternalistic concerns broader than those of limited 
intelligence. See id. at 285 ("Given the abundant empirical data on the bounded ra- 
tionality of adults of ordinary intelligence, efficient paternalism should not be re- 
stricted to special groups such as minors or the mentally disabled."). 
Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1545. 
3See, e.g., Greg Winter, F.D.A. Action Could Change Food Marketing on the Web, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at Cll ("Under the 1990 law that dictates food labeling, the 
F.D.A. cannot approve health claims for a type of food until there is 'significant scien- 
tific agreement' that it helps with an illness."); cf William K. Stevens, Asbestos Debate Re- 
emerges in Dispute over Building Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1990, at C4 (discussing the 
scientific debate on the dangers of asbestos and what health regulations would best 
protect everyone). 
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the phrase "economic judgment" for the phrase "health and diet" in 
the preceding analogy leads to a similar mix of information, persua- 
sion, and regulation. 
The second purpose of introducing the concept of asymmetric pa- 
ternalism is "positive" or "descriptive" rather than "normative" or "pre- 
scriptive." Many economic analyses of law are explicitly positive or de- 
scriptive: these analyses try to explain how laws evolved to meet 
efficiency needs. The evolutionary quality of legal rules allows for le- 
gal regulation to gravitate toward socially useful forms even when their 
logic remains poorly articulated. If asymmetrical paternalism is so- 
cially useful, therefore, we might expect that instances of it would, in 
fact, have already evolved. Indeed, below we show that many existing 
regulations can, in fact, be interpreted as asymmetrically paternalis- 
tic.37 It is hard to understand how such laws could promote efficiency 
in a world in which all agents are rational. An appealing way to ex- 
plain how these laws came about is that the law reflects what we are 
calling asymmetric paternalism and uses it as a cost-benefit standard. 
In this sense, asymmetric paternalism complements the basic law and 
economics belief that the law tends to move toward efficient solutions. 
An attentiveness to minimizing costs to rational actors while maximiz- 
ing benefits to boundedly rational actors fits well within a richer con- 
ception of efficiency. 
The third and final purpose for asymmetric paternalism is that it 
helps frame research conducted by social scientists interested in the 
law. Asymmetric paternalism, specifically as expressed in equation (1) 
above, provides a general framework for evaluating the efficiency and 
robustness of paternalistic policies. Consider, for example, a policy 
that requires patients to get a second opinion before undergoing a 
particular form of surgery. If a second opinion is always desirable, 
there will be some benefit to limitedly rational consumers, who get a 
second opinion when they otherwise would not, but little cost to ra- 
tional consumers, who spontaneously seek out a second opinion (al- 
though there may be implementation costs as well as costs and bene- 
fits for insurance companies, surgeons, and hospitals). If a second 
opinion is not always desirable, there is a reduction in the benefits for 
the limitedly rational types and an increase in the costs for rational 
types. The example shows how the concept of asymmetric paternalism 
could be used to help specify the variables of key interest in evaluating 
paternalistic policies. 
See infra Part III.B (setting forth examples). 
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III. REGULATORY EXAMPLES 
We now illustrate the concept of asymmetric paternalism by 
documenting existing and potential regulatory responses to errors in 
decision making that satisfy the criterion. We focus on four types of 
policies: (1) default rules; (2) provision or re-framing of information; 
(3) cooling-off periods; and (4) limiting consumer choices. This list is 
ranked roughly in increasing order of departure from pure asymmet- 
ric paternalism-i.e., the increasing "heavy-handedness" of the policy. 
A. Defaults 
A robust finding in the behavioral-decision research literature has 
been labeled the "status quo bias."38 People are much more likely to 
stick with existing policies, consumption bundles, legislators, and so 
on than normative theories would predict, even when the costs of 
switching are very low. As is often true of robust phenomena, the 
status quo bias is almost surely due to more than one cause. One 
source is loss aversion-the tendency to place a greater negative value 
on losses than the positive value one places on equivalent gains.39 If 
people code the effects of a change in policy as gains and losses and 
the effects of change are uncertain, loss aversion produces the same 
aversion to change that underlies the aversion to mixed gambles, 
those gambles in which there is both some chance of gain and some 
chance of loss. A second source of status quo bias is what Ilana Ritoy 
and Jonathan Baron call the "omission/commission bias"-the ten- 
dency to care much more about errors of commission than about er- 
rors of omission, even when there is no obvious normative reason to 
draw a distinction.40 The omission/commission bias may, in turn, be 
See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 7 (1988) (finding that "decision makers exhibit a signifi- 
cant status quo bias"); cf Richard Thaler, 'oward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 52 (1980) (discussing situations where consumers voluntarily 
restrict their choices, deliberately not choosing so as to avoid psychic costs that the 
choices might induce). 
Loss aversion is most starkly apparent in people's strong aversion to bets that 
offer a 50-50 chance of winning or losing a fixed amount (say $100). In fact, most 
people are about indifferent between a gamble that offers a 50-50 chance of losing x 
(say $100) or winning 2x ($200) when, statistically, they should jump at the chance. In 
light of the numbers of people who gamble at actuarially unfair odds, or who invest 
their savings at far less advantageous expected rates of return, the risk aversion incum- 
bent in such preferences is difficult to justify as normatively defensible. 
40 See Ilana Ritoy & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Am- 
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fueled in part by an asymmetry in experienced regret-i.e., people's 
tendency to regret outcomes brought about by their own actions more 
than outcomes that occur as a result of inaction.' Yet a third possible 
source is procrastination-the tendency to repeatedly delay taking 
beneficial actions based on a mistaken belief that one will take them 
in the future.42 
The existence of status quo bias creates the possibility of perhaps 
the closest thing to pure asymmetric paternalism-policies that affect 
"default" outcomes. For many consumer decisions, it is necessary to 
specify the outcome in the event that the consumer does nothing. For 
instance, if a local telephone company changes its service menu, and 
asks customers to choose one of the new options, some option must 
be specified as the default option in the event that a consumer does 
not respond. As long as actively making a choice requires very little 
effort, the choice of defaults has essentially no effect on fully rational 
consumers. But for boundedly rational people who have a status quo 
bias, the choice of defaults is important. 
To illustrate, consider a situation in which there are two options, A 
and B, and it is costless to change between the two options. Suppose 
first that the "true" value of option A is x, and the value of option B is 
2x. If everyone were rational, and there were no status quo bias, then 
everyone would choose option B regardless of the defaults they may have 
been assigned. If instead some people have a status quo bias that is suf- 
ficiently strong that they would never switch from their default, aggre- 
biguity, in BEHAVIORAL AW & ECONOMICS 168, 168-72 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000) (ana- 
lyzing possible reasons and theories for omission and commission biases). 
41 See Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medevec, The Experience of Regret: What, 
When, and Why, 102 PSYCIOL. REV. 379, 391-92 (1995) (analyzing temporal patterns of 
regret and concluding that action produces greater regret in the short term while inac- 
tion produces more regret in the long term); Thomas Gilovich et al., Commission, Omis- 
sion, and Dissonance Reduction: Coping with Regret in the "Monty Hall" Problem, 21 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 182, 188 (1995) (finding that subjects are more 
regretful of actions taken than of actions forgone and thus are more likely to initiate 
remedial actions to compensate for the increased hurt in the short term); see also Ken- 
neth Savitsky et al., Remembering and Regretting: The Zeigarnik Effect and the Cognitive 
Availability of Regrettable Actions and Inactions, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
248, 254 (1997) (proving that the Zeigarnik effect, defined as the tendency for people 
to remember incomplete tasks better than completed tasks because of a feeling of un- 
resolved tension, may contribute to the temporal pattern of regret-that people tend 
to regret actions more in the short term but inaction more in the long term). 
4O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 22, at 103-24; see also Ted O'Donoghue & Mat- 
thew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, 122 (2001) (discussing how 
procrastination may be more severe when pursuing important, rather than unimpor- 
tant, goals). 
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gate utility will be higher if the default is option B. Of course, in most 
real-world situations the 
"optimal" option is likely to differ across indi- 
viduals, necessitating a more nuanced approach. One consideration 
toward this end is determining the likely best option for most peo- 
ple-what is generally referred to as a majoritarian default. The gen- 
eral argument here is that by selecting a default-the option that is 
best for the larger fraction of people-the cost of making decisions is 
eliminated for many people as non-decisions would leave most indi- 
viduals in an advantageous position. 
Unfortunately, this reflexive use of majoritarian defaults does not 
end the inquiry necessary in setting a default. Another consideration 
is the relative cost of different types of errors. For example, if there 
were higher costs associated with choosing option B, when option A is 
better, than the costs of choosing option A, when option B is better, a 
rationale would exist for making option A the default. Yet another 
consideration is whether there is any asymmetry in the status quo bias. 
For example, if the status quo bias is stronger for people starting with 
option B, that would provide another rationale for making option A 
the default. Much of the legal debate on contract default rules can be 
cast as a response to the consideration of the likelihood of error and 
the cost of inefficient contract outcomes.43 
1. Insurance Rights 
An interesting natural experiment illustrating the power of de- 
faults took place in the neighboring states of NewJersey and Pennsyl- 
vania. Both states passed tort-reform legislation which forced compa- 
nies to offer insurance with limited rights to sue after an accident. 
However, in NewJersey a limited right to sue was the default, and cus- 
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco- 
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91-95 (1989) (providing theories of how 
courts and legislatures should set default rules); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Forseeability: 
Consequential Damages in the Law of Contracts, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 138 (1989) (argu- 
ing that current judicial attitudes, emphasizing expectation damages, should be set 
aside in favor of views based on tacit risk assumption and greater acceptance of free- 
dom of contract due to greater precision and to advance the long-term welfare of con- 
tracting parties); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a 
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 970 (1983) (stating that 
common law contract rules for mitigation are deficient due to their imprecision and 
the uncertain judicial treatment of contract provisions); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic 
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615, 648 (1990) 
(explaining that in crafting contract default rules, the preference for expansive default 
rules may be more efficient, and that established theories fail to adequately account for 
strategic incentives in bargaining). 
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tomers had to pay extra to acquire a full right to sue, whereas in Penn- 
sylvania the default was a full right to sue, and customers received a 
discount if they switched to a limited right to sue. When offered the 
choice, only about 20% of New Jersey drivers chose to acquire a full 
right to sue, while approximately 75% of Pennsylvanians retained a 
full right.44 The difference in amount spent on insurance in the two 
states was approximately $200 million.45 This example reveals little 
about what the default ought to be but clearly illustrates the powerful 
effects defaults can have, suggesting the need to choose defaults care- 
fully. 
2. Retirement Saving 
A more ubiquitous example of status quo bias, and of seemingly 
beneficial policy changes, comes from studies of retirement savings 
accounts. When a company offers a 401 (k) or similar retirement plan, 
employees must decide whether to participate. Until recently, the de- 
fault option was non-participation. Employees had to actively choose 
to participate. In recent years, some companies have changed the de- 
fault option to participation. Employees are automatically enrolled 
unless they actively choose not to participate. Recent research by 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, and Madrian and Shea demon- 
strates that such changes can have large effects on behavior-and in 
particular that 401 (k) participation is significantly higher under 
automatic enrollment.4" 
Hence, a seemingly innocuous policy change has large economic 
effects that would seem to be highly beneficial. There is a widespread 
perception among policymakers that people are undersaving, both 
from a societal perspective-as reflected in the macroeconomic con- 
Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993). 
Id. An alternative explanation for this phenomenon is that consumers regarded 
the regulators' choice of default as expressing information about what was best. This 
explanation requires an ancillary assumption that either people believe their own 
state's regulators more than the other state's regulators or that it is costly to obtain in- 
formation about the other state's regulations. 
See JAMES J. CIIOI ET AL., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DEFAULT EFFECTS AND 
401 (K) SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 2 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2002-2, 
2002) (finding that "automatic enrollment has a dramatic effect on retirement savings 
behavior"); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 QJ. ECON. 1149, 1184 (2001) (discussing 
the impact of automatic enrollment in 401 (k) savings plans and concluding that par- 
ticipation is higher among plans with automatic enrollment). 
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cern that the U.S. aggregate saving rate is too low-and from an indi- 
vidual perspective-as reflected in people's self-reports that they save 
less than they would like.47 Moreover, given the favorable tax treat- 
ment of 401 (k) accounts, and given that employers often provide par- 
tial matching funds, 401 (k) plans are an especially effective means of 
saving. 
Choi and his colleagues and Madrian and Shea, however, identify 
an important problem that arises with automatic enrollment. An in- 
tegral part of any automatic enrollment scheme is that the plan must 
also include a default contribution rate and a default asset allocation. 
For the firms studied, the defaults chosen were a relatively low contri- 
bution rate (2% or 3%)'8 and a relatively conservative asset allocation 
(often 100% to a money-market fund).4) Both defaults are disadvan- 
tageous-the former because it limits usage of the 401 (k) plan, and 
the latter because stocks have historically outperformed bonds for any 
typical time horizon for retirement.3? Consistent with the status quo 
bias, a substantial fraction of 401 (k) participants hired under auto- 
matic enrollment retain both the default contribution rate and the de- 
fault fund allocation well after enrollment, even though few employ- 
ees hired before automatic enrollment picked this particular 
combination.1 Indeed, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick con- 
clude for their sample that the increased wealth accumulation due to 
increased enrollment rates was roughly offset (on average) by the de- 
creased wealth accumulation resulting from lower contribution rates 
and more conservative asset allocations.' 
7See STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, MILES TO GO: A STATUS REPORT ON 
AMERICANS' PLANS FOR RETIREMENT 9 (1997) (finding three-quarters of those surveyed 
believed they should be saving more for retirement); B. Douglas Bernheim, Do House- 
holds Appreciate Their Financial Vulnerabilities? An Analysis of Actions, Perceptions, and Pub- 
lic Policy, in AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE 1990s, 1, 1-30 (1994). 
CHOI ETAL., supra note 46, at 13; Madrian & Shea, supra note 46, at 1153. 
Madrian & Shea, supra note 46, at 1171. 
5See Thomas E. MaCurdy & John B. Shoven, Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth, in 
TOPICS IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 61, 66 (David A. Wise ed., 1992) (considering 
whether, given historical returns, a hypothetical faculty member with a twenty-five-year 
investment horizon would be better off with an all-stock or an all-bond portfolio, and 
concluding that an all-stock portfolio was almost always better); see also Shlomo Ben- 
artzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 QJ. 
ECON. 73, 73 (1995) (reporting "[t]he empirical fact that stocks have outperformed 
bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin"). 
51 CHOI ET AL., supra note 46, at 13. 
2 See id. at 22 ("[A]utomatic enrollment failed to dramatically raise wealth accu- 
mulation because of the conservative nature of the automatic enrollment defaults."). 
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As these results indicate, the choice of defaults requires careful at- 
tention, and minor details can have significant effects. Further evi- 
dence suggests that even the set of options available may influence al- 
locations. Benartzi and Thaler show that people tend to allocate their 
savings evenly across all available options. For example, if a 401 (k) 
plan provides a menu of N options, people tend to allocate proportion 
1/N of their savings to each option.53 As a result, the net allocation 
between stocks and bonds depends almost completely on the fund 
manager's often arbitrary choice of which funds to offer. 
It is also worth noting that policymakers may be able to use the 
status quo bias in their favor. Thaler and Benartzi observe that many 
401 (k) participants would like to increase their contribution rates, but 
would prefer to do so in the future rather than now.54 Thaler and 
Benartzi proposed the "Save More Tomorrow Program," which takes 
advantage of this fact. Specifically, their approach offers workers a 
plan in which their contributions increase by small increments each 
year-small enough to ensure that they still receive at least a nominal 
wage increase each year.5" A subsequent study found that even requir- 
ing employees to choose among a menu of retirement options with no 
default, but with choice among a menu of options, led to a net in- 
crease in savings.5"" A milder form of paternalism could hardly be 
imagined. The authors also found dramatic increases in contribution 
rates among such workers.)7 
Although the policy changes discussed above were implemented 
by the private sector, current public policy discussions of retirement 
savings might incorporate these ideas.'8 Moreover, private policy 
changes discussed above, in fact, originated from the public sector, 
because the companies were reacting to new legislation that limited 
the fraction of income that higher income employees could put aside 
Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 79 (2001). 
Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving 4 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors). 
55 Id. 
James J. Choi et al., Benign Paternalism and Active Design: A Natural Experi- 
ment in Savings 2 (Aug. 29, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
Id. at 11 (finding that "the vast majority of the participants (80%) have re- 
mained in the plan through three pay raises," dramatically increasing contribution 
rates). 
See the Conclusion below for further discussion of whether we should expect 
the market to provide asymmetrically paternalistic policies. 
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as a function of the contribution average throughout the firm; these 
regulations were intended to provide an incentive for companies to 
enroll large numbers of employees.59 
B. Framing and Information Disclosure 
A general conclusion from behavioral economics is that people of- 
ten do not understand and interpret situations as economists normally 
assume. This might take the form of ignoring features of the situation 
that economists deem to be relevant (such as base rates when making 
probability judgments), or conversely, it might involve people being 
affected by features that economists assume to be irrelevant (such as 
superficial differences in how options are described). An implication 
of such effects is that re-framing a situation in subtle ways that would 
be irrelevant from the perspective of the standard economic model 
can have large effects on behavior.60 The power of such framing ef- 
fects, much like the power of defaults, gives rise to another form of 
nearly pure asymmetric paternalism: policy changes that require firms 
to re-frame their contracts, or provide seemingly irrelevant additional 
information. Such requirements might help irrational people make 
better decisions, while having absolutely no effect on fully rational 
people. Indeed, for many of the examples we discuss below, the main 
cost for such policies is that of implementation. 
We begin with some potential (but not yet existing) regulatory re- 
sponses. From an economic perspective, one situation in which peo- 
ple make decisions that seem less than rational is state lotteries. While 
many people play such lotteries with a realistic sense of their chance of 
winning, there is evidence that others are not so well in- 
formed.61 There is substantial research showing that people tend to 
overweigh small probabilities of large salient outcomes, which proba- 
See I.R.C. ? 401 (k) (3) (A) (ii) (2002) ("A cash or deferred arrangement shall not 
be treated as a qualified cash or deferred arrangement unless... the actual deferral 
percentage for eligible highly compensated employees ... bears a relationship to the 
actual deferral percentage for all other eligible employees." (emphasis added)). 
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Deci- 
sions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 
67, 68 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (arguing that "the logic of 
choice does not provide an adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of decision 
making"). 
6See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15, at 7-8 (detailing misconceptions of 
chance). 
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62 
bly plays a significant role in the popularity of lotteries.6 Consider, 
then, a policy that requires prominent posting of information about 
the odds of winning a lottery and of the real payoffs-in terms of the 
after-tax discounted present value of earnings-even perhaps some 
acknowledgement from purchasers that they have been exposed to 
this information. Since low probabilities are so difficult to represent 
cognitively, it may help to use graphical devices, metaphors (imagine 
choosing one ping-pong ball out of a large swimming pool filled with 
balls), or relative-odds comparisons (winning the lottery is about as 
likely as being struck by lightning in the next week). If people are 
purchasing lottery tickets with a full understanding of associated 
probabilities and payoffs, then providing such information would have 
absolutely no effect.6 If, however, people are making cognitive errors, 
the information might help alleviate those errors. 
As another example, consider "rent-to-own" establishments that 
lease consumer durables and furniture to, typically, low-income con- 
sumers.64 Most states treat these contracts as rental agreements rather 
than loans, even though 70% of the time consumers eventually buy 
the products they rent.65 As a result, firms are free from the regula- 
tions associated with loans, including regulations that cap interest 
rates. The final prices that consumers pay are high-typically two or 
three times normal retail price of the good-and the implicit interest 
rates, if one views these contracts as loans, are astronomical-100% 
per year or more.66 An asymmetrically paternalistic regulation might 
force firms to clearly state the true cost of purchasing an item, along 
with the interest rate implied by doing so. Provision of such informa- 
2 See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in 
BEHAVIORAL AW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 40, at 374, 374-76 (discussing ways in 
which the vividness of imagery distorts assessments of probability). 
While some people might object on the ground that reminding people of how 
long the odds are only "ruins their fun," this is true only if their "fun" is based on a 
misperception. Hence, irrespective of whether this objection is valid, it is not consis- 
tent with traditional rational choice objections to paternalism. 
See generally Joseph P. Fried, Rent-a-Center Charged with Price Gouging, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2001, at B8 (reporting that electronic equipment rented to the poor had base 
charges of approximately three times the suggested retail price); David Leonhardt, 
Economic View: TV's, DVD's: All Yours, but First Do the Math, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, ? 
3, at 4 (claiming that rent-to-own companies selling to customers with little or no 
credit often mask the true cost of their products). 
James M. Lacko et al., Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Staff 
Report: Survey of Rent-to-Own Customers, at ES-1 (2000), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/reports/index.htm. 66 Id. at ES-3 to ES-5. 
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tion would help consumers who would otherwise enter the transaction 
without understanding the economic ramifications, while not affect- 
ing those who understand the true cost from the beginning. 
A third class of examples involves misperceptions of compound- 
ing. Many studies show that people underestimate how rapidly growth 
rates compound. A typical heuristic is to assume linear growth, so that 
a process which grows at a rate of 1% per year doubles in 100 years, 
but this significantly underestimates the compounding effect of inter- 
est. A little instruction in how rapidly compounding occurs could 
benefit consumers who run up credit card debts.67 
While the examples above suggest where new asymmetrically pa- 
ternalistic policies might be useful, there are some realms, to which we 
now turn, in which similar asymmetrically paternalistic policies already 
exist. 
1. Consumer Protection 
The most ubiquitous and recognizable form of existing asymmet- 
rically paternalistic regulation involving framing and information dis- 
closure is the provision of information to consumers mandated by dis- 
closure legislation. Home-buyers, mortgagers, and lessees are all 
subject to a barrage of text detailing terms and costs. In some cases, 
documents require multiple signatures verifying that the relevant 
party has read and absorbed the information. The standard justifica- 
tion for such disclosure regulations is that they will protect consumers 
from unscrupulous and deceitful sellers and lenders while simultane- 
ously fostering a more competitive market place by encouraging a bet- 
ter informed consumer who will, hopefully, act more properly in her 
own best interest. 
The Federal Truth in Lending Act (Act) ,68 a key component of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act,69 served as the starting point for this 
type of legislation. One of its express purposes was to promote the 
"informed use of credit" through an "awareness of... cost[s] ... by 
consumers."70 This "meaningful disclosure" in turn had two goals: (1) 
7See DAVID LAIBSON ET AL., A DEBT PUZZLE 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7879, 2000) ("[A]verage [credit card] debt per household rises to 
over $6,000.... [A]t least 63% of all households with credit cards are borrowing (i.e., 
paying interest) on those cards." (citation omitted)). 68 15 U.S.C. ?? 1601-1667f (2000). 
69 Id. ?? 1601-1693. 
70Id. ? 1601(a). 
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to enable the consumer to compare credit terms and, thereby, make 
an informed choice among available credit offers; and (2) "to protect 
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit 
card practices."71 
These twin aims reflect the kind of asymmetric paternalism that 
we are seeking to promote. The Act provides potentially substantial 
benefits to those who are less than rational; it may save some consum- 
ers, otherwise uninformed, from possible catastrophic outcomes, such 
as losing their homes. These benefits are obtained at minimal cost to 
both informed consumers and providers. Educated consumers essen- 
tially ignore the mandated disclosures while uneducated consumers 
could potentially reap the positive benefits of additional information. 
As for providers, financial institutions and other service providers have 
developed forms setting forth the required information to ensure 
compliance with state and federal disclosure laws. Any early costs in- 
curred with the initial creation of the disclosure forms appear minimal 
when amortized. Even documents that detail individual costs that 
must be customized for each consumer are easily generated today via 
computer, and impose a minimal burden on providers. 
By way of example, consider how the Act governs required disclo- 
sures for home mortgages.72 Financial institutions must provide po- 
tential borrowers with terms such as the annual percentage rate and 
the monthly payment.73 In addition, the creditor must explicitly in- 
form the borrower what it means to take out a mortgage: "If you ob- 
tain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. You 
could lose your home, and any money you have put into it, if you do 
not meet your obligations under the loan."74 This last declaration ex- 
emplifies asymmetric paternalism: it imposes little cost on the finan- 
cial institution to reproduce a form disclosure document. The in- 
formed consumer will already be aware of the consequences of 
defaulting on a mortgage, so she will not be helped by the regulation, 
but neither will she be adversely affected. For the naive consumer, the 
disclosure can be enormously beneficial, moving her one step closer 
to educated consumer status. 
Over the years, the Act has generated a multilayered statutory 
framework of disclosure regulation on both the federal and state level. 
71 Id. 
7See id. ? 1639 (listing specific disclosures such as the risk of losing one's home 
for failure to satisfy mortgage obligations). 
Id. ? 1639(a) (2). 
Id. ? 1639(a)(1)(B). 
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In so doing, its reach has expanded beyond basic credit practices to 
encompass various types of sales and other arrangements. Both fed- 
eral and state legislation require credit and other service providers to 
provide two types of information to potential consumers: (1) the 
terms of the credit or other arrangement; and (2) the costs associated 
with the extension of credit or other purchase.75 
State laws complement the Act by regulating the disclosure of fees 
and costs. Returning to the mortgage context, states typically require 
lenders to disclose the itemized costs of obtaining the loan, such as 
credit reports, appraisals, insurance, taxes, and escrow fees.7 States 
have also expanded on the federal legislation by requiring similar dis- 
closures in a variety of other loan situations, including reverse mort- 
gages,77 insurance premium financing,78 title loans,79 home equity 
loans,80 home improvement loans,8' and credit sales contracts.82 
Finally, in recent years, both federal and state governments have 
ventured beyond the credit context in requiring information disclo- 
sure. One significant development has occurred in the automobile 
industry. Over the last fifteen to twenty years, there has been an ex- 
plosion in car leasing arrangements in lieu of the traditional outright 
purchase. Concerns arose over the lack of clarity in leasing terms and 
the perceived failure of consumers to fully appreciate the costs and 
other implications of leasing as opposed to purchasing. In response, 
the Federal Reserve Board implemented Regulation M pursuant to 
the Act, which governs all types of consumer leases.83 More particu- 
See, e.g., id. ? 1639(a)(2) (requiring disclosure of the annual percentage rate, 
amount, and variance of monthly payments); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ? 19.146.030 
(West 1999) (listing the required disclosure elements, including percentage rates, cost- 
of-credit reports, and conditions of lock-in agreements). 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ? 19.146.030(b) (West 1999) (containing an 
extensive list of items a mortgage broker must disclose). 
7See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ? 11-38-109 (2001) (providing an example of disclo- 
sure necessary in a reverse mortgage). 
sSee, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE ? 778.4 (West 1993) (detailing what information must 
be provided by an insurance broker). 
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. ? 31-1-818 (2001) (explaining the required disclo- 
sures for title loan agreements). 
See, e.g., 9 V.I. CODE ANN. ? 142 (1998) (detailing consumer protection disclo- 
sures for home equity loans). 
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ? 520.73 (West 1997) (listing information that must be 
disclosed for home improvement loans). 
82 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ? 476-4 (1993) (specifying the requirements for credit 
sale contracts). 
See 12 C.F.R. ? 213.1 (2001) (addressing the "[a]uthority, scope, purpose, and 
enforcement" of Regulation M). 
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larly, many states have recently enacted legislation specific to automo- 
bile leasing. Such statutes typically require lessors to disclose the dis- 
tinction between a lease agreement and a purchase agreement and to 
set forth both the monthly and total costs that the consumer will in- 
cur.84 As with mortgage disclosures, leasing disclosure regulations are 
a prototype of asymmetric paternalism: compliance is easy and cheap, 
and neither consumers nor sellers are significantly restricted in their 
market activities. 
There is, of course, much debate about how much information 
consumers can process and about the costs and benefits of providing 
information in specific settings. Any complete accounting of such 
regulations must take such costs into account. One important cost is 
the negative effect of new information on the likelihood of consumers 
paying attention to existing information as consumers begin to suffer 
from "information overload." When hammers start to sprout warnings 
of the danger they pose to thumbs, and ladders of the risk of falling, 
additional information confers ever smaller benefits and can actually 
backfire if it distracts consumers from more worthy warning messages. 
Information can also have unintended consequences for feelings 
and behavior. As an example of an effect on feelings, providing in- 
formation about the odds of winning the lottery would not serve a 
benefit if it fails to deter purchases yet makes purchasers feel stupid 
and decreases the enjoyment they get from playing. On the behavior 
side, it has been argued that, contrary to their stated aims, the food 
labeling acts that require retailers to display detailed facts about food 
content may have had little impact on consumer behavior, and may 
have even contributed to the epidemic of eating disorders in the 
United States.8 The existence of such hidden costs does not argue 
against the principle of asymmetric paternalism, but does suggest that 
a very careful accounting of costs needs to be undertaken before de- 
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ? 481L-2 (Supp. 2001) (listing the warnings a retail 
lessor is required to disclose to the lessee in the lease agreement); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. ? 361-D:4 (1995) (declaring certain warnings that must be included in motor ve- 
hicle leasing agreements). 
Some have disparagingly referred to this as the "Snackwell Effect," named for 
the fat-free cookie that appears to induce unrestricted consumption. See Catherine 
Censor Shemo, Fake Fats, Real Threat, VEGETARIAN TIMES, Feb. 1997, at 20 (describing 
effect of dieters being lulled by misunderstood food labeling information). Nor is 
there a clear health effect from greater nutritional information. Cf Daniel Goleman, 
Eating Disorder Rates Surprise the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at C11 ("New studies 
suggest that both anorexia and bulimia are twice as frequent as shown in earlier studies 
and that the incidence is increasing steadily."). 
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claring a particular paternalistic regulation to be asymmetrically pa- 
ternalistic. 
2. Investor Protection 
Another area in which policies that could be construed as asym- 
metrically paternalistic have already been implemented, or are under 
discussion, involves disclosure of financial information. The recent 
meltdown of Enron has led to vigorous cries for strengthening market 
safeguards to protect investors. The plight of the loyal Enron worker 
who saw her once robust retirement savings vanish virtually overnight 
has spawned a wave of proposed legislation aimed at revamping the 
structure and management of company 401(k) plans pursuant to 
ERISA.86 The goal, as expressed by Representative Ken Bentsen, is "to 
prohibit knowing misrepresentations by fiduciaries of 401(k) plans 
which may induce participants and beneficiaries to act contrary to 
their own best interest in controlling the assets in their own ac- 
counts."87 Why did the Enron 401 (k) plan wreak so much havoc? Part 
of the problem was lack of diversification: Enron's 401 (k) plan was 
too heavily invested in the company's own stock.88 As a result, when 
Enron failed, employees lost their retirement benefits along with their 
jobs. Recognizing this economic reality, the House of Representatives 
is currently considering the 401 (k) Pension Right to Know Act of 
2002, a bill designed to induce 401 (k) portfolio diversification by em- 
ployees by requiring plan sponsors to "advis[e] participants and bene- 
ficiaries of the importance of diversifying the investment of the assets 
in their accounts and of the risk of holding in their portfolios securi- 
ties of any one entity, including employer securities."89 The failure to 
so advise would be held a breach of fiduciary duty and would be penal- 
ized accordingly.90 
6See, e.g., S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing improvements to disclosure, 
account access, and accountability for retirement accounts); H.R. 3677, 107th Cong. 
(2002) (proposing new protections for 401 (k) participants). 
8Employee Savings Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3623, 107th Cong. (2002). 
See 148 CONG. REC. H51 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Bentson) 
(emphasizing the importance of protecting employee retirement plans from company 
mismanagement); 148 CONG. REC. H21 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Doggett) (describing the "blameless folks who lost their retirement savings in their 
401 (k) plan as a result of being locked in to relying on company stock by Enron man- 
agement"). 
89 H.R. 3642, 107th Cong. (2002). 
9Id. ? 2 ("Any failure by a plan administrator to carry out the requirements [of 
the Act] shall be treated as a failure by the plan administrator to carry out the plan 
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This requirement to provide advice is a nice example of asymmet- 
ric paternalism. The educated and informed investor already under- 
stands the economists' advice and hence is not affected. The less-savvy 
investor, on the other hand, will hopefully not fall prey to another En- 
ron. By heeding the call for diversification, market flaws will be cor- 
rected at a greatly reduced cost to society at large. 
3. Similar Regulatory Strategies 
Many existing policies can be interpreted as asymmetrically pater- 
nalistic, though not conceived as such. For example, consider the 
case of licensing requirements, both for certain categories of profes- 
sionals, such as physicians, and for certain activities, such as driving a 
car. Some critics of such requirements, such as Milton Friedman, have 
argued that these requirements are unnecessary because, in the for- 
mer case, people can be relied upon to gather information about phy- 
sician quality and, in the latter case, dangerous drivers can be relied 
upon to stay off the roads.9' The more common view, Milton Fried- 
man notwithstanding, is that people who pose a menace to themselves 
or others can neither be relied upon to gather adequate information 
about the competence of a physician nor keep themselves off the 
roads. The beauty of licensing requirements is that if they are truly 
diagnostic and inexpensive to administer, they impose minimal costs 
on those who are actually competent, but present a serious obstacle to 
those who are not. 
Similarly, there are conservatively paternalistic policies that with- 
hold information and are justifiable on similar grounds. Information 
withholding makes sense when it would not or should not prove useful 
to fully rational people-those who process information in the fashion 
assumed by economics-and is subject to misuse by others. As an ex- 
ample, consider various forms of "blind" review intended to avoid bias, 
such as grading students' papers without visible names. If people are 
not biased, blind review introduces hardly any costs, but if reviewers 
are biased, the benefits can be significant. 
administrator's fiduciary duties ...."). 
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962) (arguing that 
occupational licensing is an undesirable interruption of market forces). 
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C. Cooling Off 
When people are in transient emotionally or biologically "hot" 
states, they sometimes make decisions that are costly or even impossi- 
ble to reverse.92 People buy cars they cannot quite afford after breath- 
ing in the intoxicating new-car smell during a test drive. Others get 
married in the heat of passion or commit suicide when depression is 
particularly intense. Since the current state of mind may be a real 
source of well-being, responding to it is not per se a mistake. But be- 
havioral economists have suggested a variety of reasons why people 
might respond to hot states in suboptimal ways.93 For instance, people 
in hot states tend to overestimate how long those states will last, a 
phenomena that Loewenstein in one article refers to as a "hot-to-cold 
empathy gap,"94 and that Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, and Rabin in 
another article label "projection bias."95 The core insight is that peo- 
ple may also have self-control problems that lead them to overweigh 
the short-term benefits of indulging their current state of mind.96 
9Loewenstein, supra note 22, at 273 (arguing that "an excessive influence of vis- 
ceral factors" leads to self-destructive behavior such as "overeating, sexual misconduct, 
substance abuse, and crimes of passion"). 
See id. at 276 (noting a number of findings that suggest that visceral influences 
"operate independently of, and overwhelm, individual deliberation and volition"). 
94 See George Loewenstein et al., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual 
Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 445-47 (1997) (applying the empathy gap 
to the rational choice model of crime by testing how young males in various states of 
sexual arousal predict how coercively they will act in sexual situations); see also George 
Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 
428-31 (2000) (considering the application of immediate or visceral feelings to eco- 
nomic behavior, including a discussion as to the effect of the "hot-cold empathy gaps" 
in which it is difficult to imagine oneself in a cold state while in a hot state); Leaf Van 
Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of Transient Visceral Feelings, PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2003). 
5See GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN ET AL., PROJECTION BIAS IN PREDICTING FUTURE 
UTILITY 4 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. E00-284, 2000) 
(defining projection bias as "falsely projecting... current transient preferences on to 
the future"), at http://iber.berkeley.edu/wps/econ/e00-284.pdf; see also George 
Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL- 
BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 94-98 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1999) (explaining several sources of error in predicting one's feelings in the 
future); Loewenstein, supra note 22, at 289 (emphasizing the importance of including 
visceral factors in decision-making models). 
See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 22, at 444-45 (suggesting that certain commitment 
mechanisms, such as 401(k) plans, can overcome a lack of self-control); O'Donoghue 
& Rabin, supra note 22, at 106 (modeling present bias preferences under which 
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In response to hot and hasty decision making, cooling-off periods 
that force people to delay taking action for some duration-and in 
particular, allow them to reevaluate their decisions free from heat-of- 
the-moment impulses-could be useful. The following simple frame- 
work helps illustrate the costs and benefits of cooling-off periods. Let 
y denote the net benefits from undertaking some action now, so that 
fully rational people undertake the activity when It > 0. Suppose there 
are also some boundedly rational people who experience true net 
benefits t; because of one or more of the errors mentioned above, 
however, those people undertake the activity when JL + E > 0, and so 
may be hurting themselves by as much as E (some error value which 
occurs when individuals act despite It < 0). Now, consider a cooling- 
off period that requires a delay before the action is undertaken, and 
let t' denote the net benefits from undertaking the action after the 
delay. The potential benefit of the cooling-off period is that some ir- 
rational types might reverse a costly decision to undertake the action, 
and hence benefit by as much as s. The cooling-off period, however, 
has two potential costs: First, people who undertake the action re- 
gardless of the cooling-off period, whether rational or irrational, are 
hurt by tL - ', equal to the amount by which the delay reduces their 
net benefits. Second, some people for whom the action is on net 
beneficial (It > 0) may be deterred from the activity; if so, they suffer 
at most 
- 
- '. Hence, a cooling-off period may be valuable when the 
utility loss due to errors, e, is large while the lost benefit from a delay, 
' * n 97 I 
- /i, is small.9 
Cooling-off periods appear more intrusive than our earlier poli- 
cies, and should thus be implemented with much greater reticence 
and only after careful analysis. Nevertheless, when implemented se- 
lectively, cooling-off periods may reflect good examples of asymmetric 
paternalism. In many instances, they impose minimal costs if people 
are rational-the cost of delaying the purchase of a car by a few days, 
"stronger relative weight [is given] to the earlier moment as it gets closer"); David Isaac 
Laibson, Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption 9 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dis- 
sertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the M.I.T. Libraries) 
(arguing that human preferences, as modeled by the hyperbolic discount function, 
"set[] up a conflict between today's preferences and the preferences which will be held 
in the future"), available at http://theses.mit.edu/Dienst/UI/2.0/Describe/ 
0018.mit.theses%2fl994-72?abstract=. 
The status quo effect discussed above might limit the benefits of cooling-off pe- 
riods. To the degree that people exhibit a bias in favor of the status quo, they will re- 
frain from reversing a harmful decision on some occasions even though the cooling of 
their ardor would otherwise have led them to do so. 
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or of delaying a marriage by a few weeks, is not plausibly large. At the 
same time, cooling-off periods protect those people who make deci- 
sions in the heat of the moment. Below, we consider several examples 
where we believe these conditions are satisfied-and in which legisla- 
tors appear to share our opinion. 
Cooling-off periods take two different forms. They could force 
people to delay action until after a cooling-off period. Alternatively, 
they could enable immediate decisions but render them reversible 
during a cooling-off period. To illustrate the difference, consider a 
three-day cooling-off period for the purchase of a new car. Under the 
first form, when a person signs a contract to buy a car, they must wait 
three days before taking possession of the car (and can change their 
mind during this period). Under the second form, the person can 
take possession of the car immediately, but can return it within three 
days. Clearly, decision-reversal periods are less costly to the individu- 
als making the decision than mandatory time delays. But in many 
situations, decision-reversal periods are either not feasible-it is im- 
possible, for example, to undo unsafe sex or suicide-or too costly to 
implement-for example, when using a purchased good during the 
cooling-off period causes significant depreciation in the value of the 
good. But for many important life decisions such as marriage, di- 
vorce, and suicide, even mandatory delays are not particularly costly. 
The beneficial effects of cooling-off periods may extend beyond 
those incurred by people who directly take advantage of these periods. 
In the absence of cooling-off periods, people who benefit from others' 
hot decisions, such as insurance and automobile salespersons, have an 
incentive to instill such agitated states. The fact that consumers will 
have an opportunity to cool off may decrease sellers' incentive for en- 
couraging agitation, particularly if there is a cost to the seller when the 
consumer pulls out of the deal. Indeed, if such a cost is sufficiently 
large, then sellers may actually take pains to ensure that the consumer 
is not only cool, but has deliberated about the costs and benefits of 
the purchase. 
Framed in this fashion, it is striking how readily a variety of regula- 
tory approaches may be cast as providing introspective reexamination 
free from heat-of-the-moment impulse. 
1. Consumer Protection 
Concern that consumers, in certain predictable situations, are 
prone to make hasty, uninformed decisions has led to extensive con- 
sumer protection regulation at both the federal and state levels. The 
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most comprehensive scheme exists with respect to home solicitation 
sales (the once ubiquitous door-to-door salesman). In 1972, the Fed- 
eral Trade Commission, concerned about high-pressure sales tactics, 
enacted a rule imposing a cooling-off period for all door-to-door sales. 
All such sales must be accompanied by a written statement informing 
the buyer that she has the right to rescind any purchase within three 
business days of the transaction.98 Most states have followed the FTC's 
lead and enacted similar legislation. While some permit the buyer to 
waive the cooling-off period under certain conditions,99 the majority of 
states make clear that this brand of legislative paternalism is non- 
waiveable.100 
Many states have gone beyond the FTC requirement of a three-day 
cooling-off period for home solicitation sales to impose extended 
cooling-off periods in specific instances. Presumably, such regulations 
reflect an added measure of paternalism-a feeling that certain 
groups of people and/or services demand additional protection. Sen- 
ior citizens have been particular beneficiaries of these state laws. Any- 
one who has watched television in the past fifteen years remembers 
the commercial featuring the unfortunate elderly woman lying help- 
less on the floor. She is saved by an emergency response bracelet acti- 
vated by the memorable plaintive wail: "Help! I've fallen and I can't 
get up." In 1992, California responded to the popularity of those 
units by giving a buyer seven days to cancel a door-to-door sale of a 
personal emergency response unit.10' Other states have mandated 
cooling-off periods for home food service plans,'02 home solicitation 
9See FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period Made for Sales at Homes or at Certain Other 
Locations, 16 C.F.R. ? 429.1(a) (2002) (requiring that the front page of the contract 
specify that the buyer "may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the 
third business day"). 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE ? 5-19-12(c) (1975) ("The provisions of this section shall not 
apply if the buyer furnishes the seller with a separate dated and signed personal state- 
ment describing an emergency requiring an immediate remedy and modifying or waiv- 
ing his right to cancel."); KAN. STAT. ANN. ? 50-640(c) (1) (C) (1994) (providing that in 
the event of a bona fide emergency, the consumer may furnish the seller with a state- 
ment waiving her right to cancel within three business days). 100 
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ? 44-5002(D) (West 1994) ("Any provision of a 
contract, offer or agreement that waives a buyer's right to cancellation under this sec- 
tion is void and has no effect."). 1 See CAL. CIV. CODE ? 1689.6(b) (West Supp. 2002) ("[A] buyer has the right to 
cancel a home solicitation contract or offer for the purchase of a personal emergency 
response unit until midnight of the seventh business day ...."). 
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, ? 3-502(1-A) (West 1997) (instructing that 
a first-time buyer has the right to cancel a home food service plan prior to the delivery 
of any food and up until midnight of the tenth day after the purchase agreement was 
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purchases by senior citizens,'13 adult and vocational education pro- 
grams,104 solicited charitable contributions,'05 health studio service 
contracts,'06 and campsite time-shares.'?7 
Congress has also stepped in to require cooling-off periods in cer- 
tain instances. For example, it enacted a cooling-off period for home 
equity loans by granting buyers a limited right to rescind certain credit 
transactions involving the buyer's principal dwelling as a security in- 
terest.'08 More recently, Congress imposed a waiting period on any 
employee waiver of rights under the Age Discrimination in Employ- 
ment Act (ADEA).'09 That legislation was prompted by the need to 
ensure that any action on the part of the employee was "knowing and 
voluntary" and not hasty or coerced.1? 
Under normal conditions, this type of protectionist legislation 
might seem overly paternalistic. However, all of the above regulations 
target specific transactions where experience has shown that consum- 
ers are likely to act under influences other than rational decision mak- 
ing. These regulations likely impose costs on sellers, but the greatest 
costs focus on those sellers who benefit from consumers making hasty, 
ill-conceived decisions in the heat of the moment. 
signed). 
103 
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ? 51-18-02(1) (1999) (providing that a buyer sixty-five 
years of age or older has fifteen business days to cancel a home solicitation contract). 04 
See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/15.1a(1)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (estab- 
lishing that a student has before midnight of the fifth business day after enrollment to 
cancel and receive a full tuition refund). 
105 
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ? 6-16-106(1)(b) (2001) (granting an individual the 
right to cancel her monetary contribution until midnight of the third business day, or 
midnight of the first business day if the contribution was non-monetary). 
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ? 1812.85(b)(1) (West 1998) (mandating that a con- 
tract for health studio services must be cancelable at any time prior to midnight on the 
third business day). 
107 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. ? 18-14-703(a) (Michie Supp. 2001) (providing that 
the buyer of a camping site time-share has until midnight of the fifth business day to 
cancel the purchase). 
See 15 U.S.C. ? 1635(a) (2000) (giving a borrower the right to cancel any con- 
sumer credit transaction involving her principal dwelling as a security interest before 
midnight of the third business day after the agreement was completed). 
See 29 U.S.C. ? 626(f)(1)(G) (2000) (requiring that an agreement to waive 
one's rights may be revoked up to seven days after its inception). 
110 See id. ? 626(f) (1) ("[A]n individual may not waive any right or claim under this 
chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary ...."). 
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2. Family Law 
This cooling-off form of asymmetric paternalism also extends be- 
yond consumer protection. For example, many states have statutes 
that force potential newlyweds to wait a short period of time after their 
license has been issued before they can tie the knot."' Once married, 
couples often cannot receive a divorce decree until after a mandatory 
waiting period, which is typically much longer than the pre-marriage 
delay.12 The justification for these regulations sounds familiar: "Im- 
portant decisions should not be made in haste or under the influence 
of a powerful and potentially distorting passion.""3 However, in addi- 
tion to the considerable benefit these regulations provide couples who 
act hastily in their decisions to marry or divorce, one should note that 
they impose very little cost on a couple making rational decisions. 
How onerous can a one- or two-week delay be in the context of a mar- 
riage that is supposed to last a lifetime? Even Dean Anthony Kron- 
man, who generally finds cooling-off periods "anti-democratic," notes 
that they are particularly justifiable in the context of formation or dis- 
solution of a marriage because the waiting period has few adverse con- 
sequences.14 Thus, such waiting periods are justified when they are 
short enough not to stand as a substantial barrier to those making 
good decisions, but long enough to enable people to make informed, 
rational choices. '1 
3. Settlement Agreements 
Cooling-off periods are frequently imposed in mediated settle- 
ment agreements.16 An important concern here, which has very little 
1 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW ? 13-b (McKinney 1999) ("A marriage shall not be 
solemnized within twenty-four hours after the issuance of the marriage license ...."). 
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ? 46b-67(a) (West 1995) (requiring married 
couples to wait ninety days after the filing of a complaint for dissolution or legal sepa- 
ration before court proceedings may continue). 
Kronman, supra note 7, at 788. 
1See id. at 796 (explaining that a waiting period for marriage or divorce has less 
serious consequences than a contractual relationship where timing is essential). 
Cf id. (observing that cooling-off periods for marriage and divorce are war- 
ranted (1) because they allow time to overcome clouded judgment caused by the pas- 
sions likely associated with such decisions; and (2) because speed is usually not essen- 
tial to a marriage or divorce contract). 
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE ? 10089.82(c) (West 2001) (giving the insured three 
days to rescind an agreement in an earthquake insurance mediation); FLA. R. CT. 
12.740(f) (1) (giving counsel not present during family mediation a period of ten days 
to reject the agreement); MINN. STAT. ANN. ? 572.35(2) (West 2001) (ordering a sev- 
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to do with people making errors, is to protect the legal rights of unwit- 
ting laymen. Mediated settlement agreements are often reached by 
the mediator and parties without the presence of legal counsel. As a 
result, the potential exists for the parties to misconstrue the terms and 
implications of the agreement. Moreover, a mediated settlement 
agreement can adversely affect the parties' existing legal rights."' The 
mediator's function is to generate a resolution, not to protect the par- 
ties' particular interests."8 But a second concern here, very much in 
line with behavioral economics, is that the parties may feel pressured 
to accept a bargain into which they would not otherwise enter."9 
Cooling-off periods seem sensible in this environment since short de- 
lays would likely impose minimal costs, while allowing the parties time 
to reevaluate their decisions. 
4. Other Potential Applications 
Cooling-off policies are potentially useful in any situation featur- 
ing transient hot states that cause people to make distorted decisions 
and produce consequences that are difficult to reverse. One such 
situation is suicide. The human mind is perversely constituted such 
that, when one is unhappy, it is difficult to generate happy thoughts or 
memories. " As a result, people who suffer depressive episodes report 
that they lose perspective and have difficulty either imagining ever 
feeling better or recalling that they ever felt better in the past."' Un- 
enty-two-hour delay before a creditor-debtor mediation agreement becomes binding). 7 
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. ? 572.35(1) (b) (West 2001) (acknowledging that "sign- 
ing a mediated settlement agreement may adversely affect [parties'] legal rights"). 
See id. ? 572.35(1) (a) (stating that "the mediator has no duty to protect [party] 
interests"). 
Fear of embarrassment can be an extraordinarily potent force in daily behavior. 
See LEAF VAN BOVEN ET AL., THE ILLUSION OF COURAGE: UNDERESTIMATING SOCIAL- 
RISK AVERSION IN SELF AND OTHERS (Working Paper, n.d.) (on file with authors). In 
general, very small incentives can have a disproportionate impact, if they are immedi- 
ate. For example, cocaine addicts have been treated successfully by offering them very 
small daily rewards for abstinence, even though one would expect the magnitude of 
such an addiction to overshadow such small rewards. See Michael D. Mueller, Voucher 
System Is Effective Tool in Treating Cocaine Abuse, NIDA NOTES, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 8 (de- 
scribing a treatment program in which cocaine abusers receive vouchers that can be 
exchanged for items when they test negative for cocaine), available at http:// 
www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA%5FNotes/NNVoll ON5/Voucher.html. 
120 Gordon H. Bower, How Might Emotions Affect Learning?, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EMOTION AND MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY 3, 20-23 (Sven-Ake Christianson ed., 
1992) (explaining that unhappy people dwell on unhappy subjects and memories). 
121 Andrew Solomon, Personal History: Anatomy of Melancholy, NEWYORKER,Jan. 12, 
1998, at 49 (explaining that in a depressed state, "[y]ou can neither remember feeling 
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able to imagine feeling better, suicide may feel like the only escape. 
Studies of terminally ill patients likewise show that the will to live fluc- 
tuates dramatically from hour to hour, suggesting that patients are 
unable to bridge the gap between fluctuating emotional and health 
states.22 
The fact that suicide is currently illegal marks a classic form of 
heavy-handed paternalism (and is, in any case, difficult to enforce). 
An alternative policy suggested by asymmetric paternalism is to sanc- 
tion suicide, but only after a mandatory cooling-off period. Such a 
policy might, for example, require a suicidal person to "give notice" of 
the desire to commit suicide one month in advance with the ability to 
rescind the notice at any point during the intervening period (once 
rescinded, it would have to be reinitiated to go into effect again). 
Such a policy imposes costs on those whose situation is so miserable 
that the intervening month would be one of unremitting misery. 
However, a month of misery does not seem excessively onerous for 
such a momentous decision. Moreover, such a policy is clearly less 
costly in these terms than the current blanket prohibition against sui- 
cide. Even a society unwilling to countenance suicide for the chroni- 
cally depressed might employ an asymmetrically paternalistic ap- 
proach to the controversial issue of assisted suicide. In cases of 
painful terminal illness, for example, momentary despondency or 
even pressure from anguished relatives could be alleviated by stretch- 
ing out the time horizon over when decisions need to be made. We 
do not claim, of course, that concerns about impulsive hot-state behav- 
ior are the sole, or even the primary, source of controversy in the de- 
bates over suicide and assisted suicide. Our claim is only that this as- 
pect of the debate could be confined by a less heavy-handed 
regulatory tool than outright prohibition. 
Another situation with similar characteristics is drug use. Scholars 
recognize that "cravingis a motivational state ... equated with the sub- 
jective desire for the effects of a drug."23 Craving, like depression, not 
only motivates certain behaviors, but it crowds out virtually all consid- 
erations other than, in this case, drug taking. In a neurological study 
of addiction, Frawley refers to a "process of... increasing the behav- 
ior that facilitates drug or alcohol use and eliminating behavior that 
better nor imagine that you will feel better"). 
2Erica Goode, Terminal Cancer Patients' Will to Live Is Found to Fluctuate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1999, at A8 (discussing a study in which cancer patients showed sub- 
stantial fluctuations in their will to live). 
123 G. Alan Marlatt, Craving Notes, 82 BRIT.J. ADDICTION 42, 42 (1987). 
2003] 245 
1246 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151: 1211 
interferes with or does not lead to drug or alcohol use. This leads to a 
kind of 'tunnel vision' on the part of the addict."'24 This effect is most 
dramatically evident in the behavior of cocaine addicts, who report 
that "virtually all thoughts are focused on cocaine during binges; 
nourishment, sleep, money, loved ones, responsibility, and survival 
lose all significance."'25 
An interesting feature of craving is that it drastically affects peo- 
ple's decisions about present actions, but has comparatively little ef- 
fect on decisions involving only future outcomes. Thus, an addict 
might be willing to pay a tremendous amount to obtain a drug imme- 
diately, but would not agree to pay such a large amount for the drug 
in the future.126 This suggests a policy lever less drastic than banning 
drugs and more asymmetrically paternalistic: dispense drugs legally 
with a mandatory waiting period (much as a pharmacy takes time to 
fill a prescription).'27 This kind of forced waiting provides a way to 
protect the future self from the craving current self. Since perfectly 
rational users will plan ahead, the forced delay imposes little cost and 
it may benefit drug users who are able to make comparatively rational 
decisions for the future. 
Cooling-off periods may also be utilized in the public domain in 
circumstances in which appeals to an emotional hot state are dis- 
trusted. If we return to Madison's concerns in The Federalist No. 10 
over political institutions succumbing to "passion," the public policy 
implications of political hot states becomes apparent.128 As a result, 
many constitutional regimes impose a cooling-off period, either ex- 
P. Joseph Frawley, Neurobehavioral Model of Addiction: Addiction as a Primary Dis- 
ease, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION: MAJOR CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION 
AND ALCOHOLISM 25, 32 (Stanton Peele ed., 1988). 
Frank H. Gawin, Cocaine Addiction: Psychology and Neurophysiology, 251 SCIENCE 
1580, 1581 (1991). 
126 
L.A. GIORDANO ET AL., OPIOID DEPRIVATION AFFECTS HOW OPIOID-DEPENDENT 
OUTPATIENTS DISCOUNT THE VALUE OF DELAYED HEROIN AND MONEY (Carnegie Mel- 
lon University, Dep't of Soc. & Decision Scis., Working Paper, n.d.) (on file with 
authors). 
7 Many states regulate liquor sales in a similar way, by restricting hours and days 
of sale. See, e.g., 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ? 4-492(4) (West 2002) (making it illegal to 
"sell malt or brewed beverages between the hours of twelve o'clock midnight of any 
Saturday and two o'clock in the forenoon of the following day"). This effectively re- 
quires an alcoholic to plan ahead, which protects alcoholics who only drink on un- 
planned binges. 128 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) 
("Where a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government... en- 
ables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights 
of other citizens."). 
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press or tacit, before constitutional change can be implemented. This 
can take the form of an express delay in constitutional amendments, 
as with the Finnish and French requirements that two successive legis- 
latures vote on any proposed changes to the constitution.2 It can also 
take the form of procedural hurdles that in effect require a sustained 
effort to effectuate change, as with the high barriers to constitutional 
amendment under the U.S. Constitution.130 
D. Limitations on Consumer Choice 
Consumers sometimes make suboptimal decisions that cannot be 
counteracted by changing the default, providing information, or let- 
ting them reconsider for a few days. In such situations, they may 
benefit from limits on the choices they face. While such policies are 
clearly the most intrusive of the policies we discuss, the same princi- 
ples can apply: we look for "conservative" limits that likely provide a 
high benefit to boundedly rational types and a low cost to rational 
types. But, since limiting choices clearly hurts rational types, we need 
to be even more careful in analyzing whether such policies are, in the 
net, beneficial. 
An example is the imposition of deadlines to combat procrastina- 
tion. A theme in the research on behavioral decision making is that 
people tend not to take an integrated approach to decision making, 
but rather make decisions using an isolated, day-by-day, or case-by-case 
approach.131 One manifestation of this tendency to take the narrow 
view is "procrastination."132 For those few abnormal readers who have 
never procrastinated, Sabini and Silver describe it vividly: 
See, e.g., FIN. CONST. ? 73 (requiring suspension of consideration of non-urgent 
constitutional proposals until after following parliamentary election); LA CONST. art. 
89 (Fr.) (requiring, in most cases, passage of amendments by two assemblies followed 
by submission to a referendum). 
U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that proposed amendments be approved by two- 
thirds of both the House and Senate as well as three-fourths of the states). 
See, e.g., Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171, 191 
(1999) (arguing that an integrated approach to decision making generally leads to bet- 
ter outcomes than a case-by-case approach does). 
2For economic models of procrastination, see George A. Akerlof, Procrastination 
and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991). See also O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra 
note 42, at 148 (discussing the effects of "naive procrastination" both in the abstract 
and in "important economic contexts"); O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 22, at 119 
("When costs are immediate, you tend to procrastinate; if you are aware that you will 
procrastinate in the future, that makes you perceive it as more costly to procrastinate 
now."); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Incentivesfor Procrastinators, 114 QJ. ECON. 
2003] 1247 
1248 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151: 1211 
Imagine you have two days to write a paper. You believe it will take about 
six hours. To avoid being rushed, you decide to get to work.... Now 
suppose you had to decide what to do for the next five minutes-either 
work on the paper or play one game of pinball .... In the short run, 
five minutes of pinball is far more pleasurable than five minutes of paper 
writing, and after all, how much of a paper can you do in five minutes? 
Pinball is the obvious choice. The game is over so you must decide about 
the next five minutes. The situation is only trivially changed, so you will 
reach the same result. Once... you've fragmented your night into five 
minute intervals, you may be doomed to play until you run out of money, 
the machine breaks, or someone meaner than you wants to play.... 
One of the ways of being irrational and procrastinating is to act on ra- 
tional calculations for intervals that are irrationally short. 
In the face of procrastination, an asymmetrically paternalistic policy 
might involve imposing periodic deadlines on decision making that 
limit a person's ability to constantly plan to do something in the very 
near future. 
Consider, for instance, a person who has some money that she 
would like to invest. Suppose she knows where she would like to invest 
it, and it is just a matter of taking the time to make the investment. If 
she can make the investment on any day she likes, then she may pro- 
crastinate doing so because she keeps delaying today based on a mis- 
taken belief that she will make the transfer within a few days. Suppose 
instead that deadlines are imposed such that her financial transactions 
are implemented only on the first of every month. As the first of the 
month approaches, she will be forced to recognize that the cost of de- 
laying past the first is not a few days, but rather an entire month. 
Hence, she may be motivated to act. Of course, such a policy imposes 
a cost on fully rational types because they may be forced to wait a few 
weeks before implementing an optimal financial transaction. But, 
much as for the short delays associated with cooling-off periods, as 
long as the frequency is not too small, such costs will be relatively 
small. 
It is perhaps useful to attach numbers to this example. Suppose a 
person has $10,000 to invest and plans to invest this money in a fund 
that will yield a 10% APR (continuously compounded). In this situa- 
tion, the cost of a one day delay is $2.75 of interest, and therefore, a 
person could easily prefer making the investment tomorrow rather 
than today. Now apply the deadlines discussed above (she can only 
769, 770 (1999) (considering the role of procrastination in the context of economic 
incentive schemes). 3 JOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVER, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 133 (1982). 
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invest on the first of the month) and consider a person's decision at 
the deadline. Because delay at the deadline means that the invest- 
ment will not be implemented for (at least) thirty days, the cost of de- 
lay is now (at least) $82.53. Therefore, the person will be more moti- 
vated not to delay.134 
Of course, whether such a policy is on net beneficial is more de- 
batable than for some of our previous policies. The same $82 cost that 
motivates irrational types to act also represents the (maximum) poten- 
tial cost to rational types who would otherwise find it optimal to make 
the investment in the middle of the month. This cost is small, but is 
certainly not negligible. On the flip side, the benefit of this policy de- 
pends on how long people would delay in the absence of the policy. If 
the answer is only a few months, then the benefit is small-on the or- 
der of a few hundred dollars of lost interest. But if people would delay 
several years-which we suspect (partly from personal experiences) is 
not implausible-then the benefit is large-on the order of several 
thousand dollars of lost interest. These numbers illustrate the point 
we discuss above: for more intrusive asymmetrically paternalistic poli- 
cies that limit consumers' choices, a more careful analysis is required 
to assess the net benefits. 
A real-world example of the effects of deadline changes comes 
from the Economic and Social Research Council of Great Britain. 
They recently eliminated submission deadlines and now accept grant 
proposals on a "rolling" basis (though they are still reviewed only pe- 
riodically); in response to this policy change, submissions actually de- 
clined by about 15-20%.135 
Another real-world example-one not usually framed in these 
terms-is the deadline for tax-exempt Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) contributions. The law does not permit people to contribute 
any amount at any time they want. Rather, there is a maximum 
amount per year, and contributions for a given year must be made by 
a deadline-April 15 of the following year.136 As a result, if people 
want to take advantage of a specific year's contribution, April 15 looms 
as a deadline. If IRA accounts are a valuable investment, then fully ra- 
For more numerical examples of this type, see O'Donoghue & Rabin, Procrasti- 
nation, supra note 3, at 133. 
1Letter from Chris Caswill, Economic and Social Research Council, to George 
Loewenstein (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with authors). 
136 See 26 U.S.C.A. ? 219(b)(5)(A) (West 2002) (setting maximum contribution 
amounts); id. ? 6072(a) (requiring returns to be filed "on or before the 15th day of 
April"). 
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tional people ought to invest in IRAs as early as possible so as to avoid 
paying taxes on the interest earned during the delay. Thus, this dead- 
line should have little effect, except to lower total IRA contributions in 
cases where a person rationally would not want to make contributions 
one year but would want to make a larger contribution the following 
year. If, by contrast, people procrastinate, then the tax deadline may 
serve a valuable role in spurring people into last-minute action. In- 
deed, Lawrence Summers reports that 45% of 1984 IRA contributions 
were actually made in 1985.137 
A third example comes from recent experimental work by Dan 
Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch.138 Their subjects were M.I.T. executive- 
education students who had to write three short papers for a class. 
The subjects were assigned to one of two experimental conditions. In 
one condition, deadlines for the three papers were imposed by the in- 
structor and were evenly spaced across the semester. In the other 
condition, each student was allowed to set her own deadlines for each 
of the three papers. In both conditions, the penalty for delay was 1% 
per day late, regardless of whether the deadlines were externally im- 
posed or self-imposed."39 While subjects in the free-choice condition 
did choose to impose deadlines on themselves, few of them chose 
evenly spaced deadlines, and those who did not performed worse in 
the course than those with evenly spaced deadlines (whether exter- 
nally imposed or self-imposed).140 These results demonstrate how im- 
posing deadlines can benefit people who might otherwise subopti- 
mally delay everything until the end of the semester. Of course, 
rational types may be hurt by being forced to write the paper sooner 
than would be optimal, but as long as the deadlines are not too severe, 
the costs to rational types should be relatively small. 
CONCLUSION 
Asymmetric paternalism aims to help boundedly rational people 
avoid making costly mistakes, while at the same time causing little or 
no harm to rational people. Thus far, we have documented a variety 
7 Lawrence H. Summers, Summers Replies to Galper and Byce on IRAs, 31 TAX NOTES 
1014, 1016 (1986). 
18 Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self- 
Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219 (2002). 
139 Id. at 220. 
Id. at 221. 
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of existing and potential regulatory responses that illustrate this con- 
cept. We conclude by discussing some broader issues. 
What we propose is, in effect, not so much a new methodology for 
regulation, but rather a new metric for evaluating the costs and bene- 
fits of regulatory options. Our approach adds nuance to the debate 
over whether market transactions should be presumed to be rational 
or whether a predictable set of heuristic failings makes the case for a 
new "anti-antipaternalism." As with all matters dealing with human 
cognition and the design of social institutions, the answers are likely to 
be less than categorical. But a richer sense of the costs and benefits of 
regulation on individual market actors is a necessary step in the design 
of proper regulatory mechanisms. 
In addition to the costs and benefits outlined above, an additional 
consideration is how the implementation of a policy will affect future 
policy decisions. In particular, a policy that currently appears unde- 
sirable may, after people have adapted to some interim policy, come 
to seem desirable. The potential for such "slippery slopes" commonly 
arises in policy debates and clearly arises here as well. But just as for 
other domains, the ideal way to deal with these possibilities is not to 
avoid policy changes altogether, but to consider the extent to which 
future policies are made to appear more or less attractive by the one 
under consideration. 
A related problem is finding the optimum of the cost-benefit func- 
tion.'41 Why are home-solicitation "victims" allowed to cool off, but 
those who buy the same product at the mall are not? Why are 
eighteen-year-olds allowed to vote, but (in most states) not permitted 
to drink alcohol until age twenty-one? These numbers did not come 
from some neuroscientific evidence that the brain's ability to vote sen- 
sibly emerges at age eighteen but resistance to alcohol isn't full-blown 
until age twenty-one. Of course, all policymaking faces this challenge 
of drawing boundaries. Like these policies, good asymmetrically pa- 
ternalistic policies should be simple and easy to enforce, and sensitive 
to errors in estimating costs and benefits. The fact that boundaries 
are hard to draw does not mean no boundary should be drawn. 
Another important policymaking question is whether there are 
private incentives to supply the paternalistic interventions we describe. 
The crucial issue is whether people who make cognitive errors are 
aware of their mistakes. If consumers are aware of their errors then 
141 See generally Zamir, supra note 6, at 256-61 (proposing a formal model for identi- 
fying efficient paternalistic regulation). 
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they will demand self-control and other external regulations on their 
own behavior, in which case they can (and often will) be privately 
supplied by firms. For instance, hotels can offer rooms without mini- 
bars to help alcoholics resist drinking, pizza delivery companies can 
allow the sophisticated yet weak-willed customer to precommit to not 
delivering past a certain hour, parents can install V-chips and other 
devices to prevent their children from disapproved behavior, and so 
forth. 
But for most of the policies we have discussed, people are unlikely 
to be aware of their errors. Consider, for instance, our discussion of 
cooling-off periods. The essence of the error is that people are over- 
sensitive to the hot state. A firm that competes in the marketplace by 
voluntarily offering a cooling-off period (at some cost to the firm) will 
not win the business of the hot customers and will profit less than a 
firm that offers no such deal. Projection-biased buyers need not only 
beware tempting sellers, but also their own inability to see temptation 
for what it is. A similar logic applies to other examples. People are 
unlikely to be willing to pay for superior defaults because they are not 
aware of the status quo effect, and if they were aware of it, they would 
think that they could overcome it. Thus, for example, it is difficult to 
imagine people paying more for a retirement plan that had a particu- 
lar default asset allocation if other plans allowed for costless realloca- 
tion. People are unlikely to pay for information because, not possess- 
ing the information, they are in no position to judge its value. Once 
they possess it, of course, they have no more reason to pay for it!142 
And, while some people do impose deadlines upon themselves, it is 
people's naivete about their own behavior that leads to procrastina- 
tion in the first place. Relying on people to impose their own dead- 
lines therefore seems unrealistic for many or most people. In each 
case, it can be seen that individuals are unlikely to value beneficial 
policies-i.e., be willing to pay for these policies-for the very reason 
that they are needed. 
In promoting asymmetric paternalism, our goal is not to dismiss 
policies that involve a more heavy-handed paternalism. Indeed, for 
many problems that merit regulation, asymmetrically paternalistic 
policies do not exist, and heavy-handed paternalism may be better 
than no regulation. At the same time, we also emphasize that our goal 
142 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 614-16 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research ed., 1964) (commenting on the role of information as a commodity and the 
issues that arise in its allocation). 
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is not to promote more paternalism. In particular, in some instances, 
the application of asymmetric paternalism may lead to rules that are 
milder than those currently in place. As an extreme example, our dis- 
cussion of suicide suggests moving from a heavy-handed policy that 
prohibits suicide to a milder policy that makes suicide legal subject to 
certain conditions. 
New technologies may introduce new possibilities for asymmetri- 
cally paternalistic policies. For example, drunk driving is especially 
ripe for conservatively paternalistic policies because alcohol increases 
people's confidence in their own driving skills at the same time as it 
actually decreases those skills-producing a massive miscalibration in 
drivers' self-awareness of their own abilities.'43 New technologies could 
potentially measure the blood alcohol level of a driver unobtrusively 
and disable the car if the level is above a designated threshold (per- 
haps with some type of override that entailed an explicit warning of 
increased culpability). Such a device would be asymmetrically pater- 
nalistic in the sense that it would be completely unobtrusive for those 
who don't need it-for example, drivers who are not drunk-but 
would regulate the behavior of those whose driving and decision mak- 
ing is assumed to be undermined. It is possible that such a device 
would introduce some costs-for example, if a husband with a blood- 
alcohol level of .06% were unable to drive his wife to the hospital to 
give birth (though such a device might discourage the husband from 
drinking to excess in the first place). However, the benefits are likely 
to overwhelm the costs. 
Finally, we return to an issue that we touched on at the outset: in 
order to properly assess asymmetrically paternalistic policies, we must 
carefully address whether patterns of apparently irrational behavior 
are mistakes or expressions of stable preference. To illustrate the im- 
portance of this distinction, consider the recent growth of extended 
warranties that are offered to individuals purchasing consumer dur- 
ables, from small electronic items to household appliances. Behav- 
ioral economics shows that people often overreact to highly salient, 
rare events, and that people are surprisingly risk averse for small gam- 
bles that pose the chance of a loss. Extended warranties capitalize on 
exactly these patterns of behavior. The fact that they are enormously 
Drunk drivers are involved in nearly 30% of all fatal accidents on the road even 
though they only account for a much smaller percentage of drivers at any point in 
time. See Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?, 109 J. 
POL. ECON. 1198, 1199 (2001) (reporting that during "time periods in which alcohol 
usage is greatest, [this] proportion rises to almost 60 percent"). 
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profitable to retailers implies they are costly to buyers. Should ex- 
tended warranties be prohibited? Should we treat those who would be 
prone to purchase them as though they are modern equivalents of 
minors or idiots?144 It depends on whether overpaying for a warranty 
is a mistake or a preference (a "bug" or a "feature" in the human 
mind). Perhaps people who buy warranties do not realize how slight 
the chance is the product will break within the warranty period, or the 
fact that the small loss they have to pay for repairs out-of-pocket can 
be easily absorbed into the hedonic ups and downs of everyday life. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that consumers who purchase 
warranties are perfectly cognizant of the relevant probabilities and de- 
rive real benefits (e.g., "peace of mind") that warrant the expenditure. 
In the face of such uncertainty, the right policy is one that encourages 
disclosure rather than, say, bans warranties. If disclosure reduces war- 
ranty purchases by reminding consumers of the low chance of product 
breakage, then purchasing the warranty would have been a mistake 
rather than a preference. If informed consumers continue to pur- 
chase the warranties, then it is quite possible that they have good rea- 
son to do so, however unfathomable that decision may seem to an 
economist. 
To sum up: asymmetric paternalism helps those whose rationality 
is bounded from making a costly mistake and harms more rational 
folks very little. Such policies should appeal to everyone across the po- 
litical spectrum and can potentially shift the debate from one about 
whether or not paternalism is justified, to one about whether the 
benefits of mistake prevention are larger than the harms imposed on 
rational people. The idea is designed to focus debates about paternal- 
ism on these empirical terms. Creating a sharp empirical debate may, 
in turn, encourage social scientists and lawyers to generate new an- 
swers. 
44 In a classic episode of The Simpsons, Homer was having a crayon hammered into 
his nose to lower his I.Q. (Don't ask.) The writers indicated the lowering of his I.Q. by 
having Homer make ever stupider statements. The surgeon knew the operation was 
complete when Homer finally exclaimed: "Extended warranty! How can I lose?" The 
Simpsons: HOMR (Fox television broadcast, Dec. 24, 2000). 
